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THREE’S A CROWD: A LOOK AT 
POTENTIAL TROUBLES CREATED BY 
THIRD-PARTY STANDING WHEN BRINGING 
A TITLE IX CLAIM 
TAYLOR A. WILSON 
I. INTRODUCTION
When now legendary football coach Hayden Fry first stepped into the head 
coaching job at the University of Iowa, clad in white pants and sunglasses, one 
of his first orders of business was redecorating Kinnick Stadium.1  With an un-
dergraduate degree in psychology, Coach Fry decided to put his schooling to 
use by getting inside the heads of the opponents his team—the Hawkeyes—
would take on.2  He did so by painting the walls, installing new carpets, and 
even replacing the ill-used urinals of the visitor locker room. 3  This would all 
seem standard, except that Coach Fry’s redecorating had a theme—everything 
new in the visitor locker room was pink.4   
Depending on the source, Coach Fry’s use of pink is said to have been a 
tactic meant to have a calming effect on visiting opponents or a ploy to create a 
connotation that they were “sissies.”5  Either way, Coach Fry believes the pink 
walls served their purpose, stating in his autobiography, “[i]t’s been fun to get 
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1. See Fred Bierman, Iowa Keeps Opponents Thinking Pink, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010, 10:38 PM),
http://thequad.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/iowa-keeps-opponents-thinking-pink/?_r=1; Travis 
Haney, Oklahoma Football: Hayden Fry’s Legacy Goes Beyond a Coaching Tree Featuring Bob 
Stoops, Kirk Ferentz, NEWS OK (Dec. 23, 2011), http://newsok.com/oklahoma-football-hayden-frys-
legacy-goes-beyond-a-coaching-tree-featuring-bob-stoops-kirk-ferentz/article/3634632/?page=2.  
2. Bierman, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.; Peter Richmond, Not So Pretty in Pink, SPORTSONEARTH (Oct. 25, 2013),
http://www.sportsonearth.com/article/63315532/. 
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the reaction of visiting coaches. . . . When I talk to an opposing coach before 
the game and he mentions the pink walls, I know I’ve got him.  I can’t recall a 
coach who has stirred up a fuss about the color and then beaten us.”6  Perhaps 
the most notable reaction to the locker rooms came from the University of Mich-
igan’s head coach, Bo Schembechler, who hated the color palette enough to or-
der his coaching assistants to cover the walls with white paper before his team 
entered the facility.7 
Coach Fry retired in 1999, but the all-pink visitor locker room at Kinnick 
Stadium remains.8  Furthermore, the University of Iowa is no longer home to 
the only athletics team implementing, or attempting to implement, the pinking 
ploy.9  Until December 2010, the University of Minnesota-Duluth Bulldogs 
hockey team played its home games at the Duluth Entertainment and Conven-
tion Center (DECC), which housed a similarly hued visitor’s facility.10  How-
ever, when plans to repeat the color scheme at the new AMSOIL Arena were 
put forth, they were met with resistance from an outside source.11  Similarly, 
after a family from Bondurant, Iowa offered to donate $3 million to the local 
high school athletic department in order to build a brand new, pink visitor’s 
locker room, the school board received some unsolicited outside counsel advis-
ing against the move.12     
Today, headlines created by pink locker rooms tend not to be based upon 
the reactions of opposing players and coaches, but instead upon the potential 
legal issues created by the seemingly feminine motif.  When plans to renovate 
Kinnick Stadium were announced in 2005, the University of Iowa made it clear 
that it intended to honor Coach Fry’s legacy by maintaining the pink visitor 
locker room.13  Erin Buzuvis, a then-visiting professor at the University of Iowa 
College of Law, attended a public forum meant to address any concerns with 
the renovation.14  It was here that she expressed her opinion that maintaining the 
pink locker room created a potential Title IX issue and that “in light of the cul-
tural association of pink with girls and sissies . . . the locker room symbolism 
                                                          
6. HAYDEN FRY & GEORGE WINE, HAYDEN FRY: A HIGH PORCH PICNIC 102–03 (1999).  
7. Sally Jenkins, Tickled Pink by Iowa’s Locker Room, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2005), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/30/AR2005093001975.html.  
8. Haney, supra note 1. 
9. See Richmond, supra note 5. 
10. Justin Magill, Closing the DECC, COLLEGE HOCKEY NEWS (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.col-
legehockeynews.com/news/2010/12/03_closing_the_decc.php.  
11. See id.  
12. See Richmond, supra note 5. 
13. Erin E. Buzuvis, Reading the Pink Locker Room: On Football Culture and Title IX, 14 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 2 (2007). 
14. Id. at 4.  
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could be perceived as a university-sponsored insult that trades in sexism and 
homophobia.”15   
Professor Buzuvis’ opinions quickly became public, and the overall re-
sponse from University officials, the press, and local citizens was less than re-
ceptive.16  However, she did find some support in her fellow legal professionals.  
Jill Gaulding, a colleague of Buzuvis at the College of Law and co-founder of 
Gender Justice, began to “[lead] protests against the pink locker room tradi-
tion.”17  It is Gender Justice that successfully stepped in and dissuaded the Uni-
versity of Minnesota-Duluth and Bondurant High School from continuing the 
trend of “pink shaming” or else risk potential legal action.18  While the potential 
Title IX issues Professors Buzuvis and Gaulding promote are intriguing—and 
most certainly have caught the eye of the media—what might sooner stand out 
to legal scholars is whether an organization such as Gender Justice has the abil-
ity to bring such a claim in court.  
Traditionally, gender discrimination claims falling under the scope of Title 
IX are brought by the person or persons who feel a direct adverse effect as a 
result of a school’s non-compliance with the law.19  More recently, outside in-
terest groups have attempted to bring third-party claims against academic insti-
tutions with varying levels of success.20  A look at recent case law reveals that 
a circuit split currently exists as to third-party standing in such instances.21 
This Comment will analyze the ability of a third party to bring a Title IX 
claim against an academic institution.  Part II will provide an overview of the 
history of Title IX claims in the United States.  Part III will analyze the legal 
concept of standing and how courts currently differ with regards to certain types 
of third-party claims.  Finally, Part IV will advocate for one side of the current 
circuit split and predict the ability of a third party to bring a claim under that 
analysis against a school such as the University of Iowa for allowing the con-
tinuance of pink locker rooms, something Professor Buzuvis postulates “w[ill] 
denigrate female athletes, and thus suppress the extent to which women would 
report an interest in athletics.”22 
                                                          
15. Id.  
16. Id. at 5.  
17. About Us, GENDER JUSTICE, http://genderjustice.us/about/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2015).  
18. Richmond, supra note 5. 
19. See generally U.S. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION’S COMMISSION FOR OPPORTUNITY IN 
ATHLETICS, “OPEN TO ALL”: TITLE IX AT THIRTY (2003), available at 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/athletics/title9report.pdf [hereinafter TITLE IX AT THIRTY].  
20. See, e.g., Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011); Am. Sports 
Council v. Dep't of Educ., 850 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.D.C. 2012). 
21. See, e.g., Equity in Athletics, 639 F.3d 91; Am. Sports Council, 850 F. Supp. 2d 288. 
22. Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 47. 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF TITLE IX CLAIMS 
In the early 1970s, Congress made the important decision to enact legisla-
tion to help eliminate sex discrimination in education.23  On June 23, 1972, Pres-
ident Nixon signed 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Title IX) into law.24  The statute states 
that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance.”25  Due to the broad language of the statute, Title IX casts a broad net, 
affecting a wide range of people and programs within the education system. 
A. Title IX As a Tool for Maintaining Gender Equity in Athletics 
While Title IX does not directly mention the elimination of discrimination 
within athletics, statistics on sports participation prior to Title IX’s enactment 
made it clear that the statute had the potential to have a drastic effect on sports 
at the interscholastic and collegiate levels.  According to research done by the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) from 1967–1968, there were 
roughly 152,000 male athletes and 15,000 female athletes participating in inter-
collegiate athletics at that time.26  A similar study done at the high school level 
in 1971 reported that 3.7 million boys and just 294,000 girls competed in 
school-sponsored sports that year.27  By 1975, the United States Department of 
Education (DOE) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) approved a regulation pursuant 
to statute, directly applying Title IX to school athletics.28  The regulation reads,  
     No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from par-
ticipation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently 
from another person or otherwise be discriminated against in 
any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics 
offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any such 
athletics separately on such basis.29 
 
                                                          
23. Donald E. Shelton, Equally Bad is Not Good: Allowing Title IX “Compliance” by the Elimina-
tion of Men’s Collegiate Sports, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 253, 253 (2001).    
24. See generally Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 44. 
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).  
26. TITLE IX AT THIRTY, supra note 19, at 13. 
27. Id.  
28. Shelton, supra note 23, at 253. 
29. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a) (2014).  
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Due to the traditional male-domination in sports, athletic departments nation-
wide fight an on-going battle to maintain equity within their programs.30  After 
the implementation of Title IX, this fact quickly became evident.   
By summer 1978, the DOE received somewhere close to 100 complaints 
alleging Title IX violations at over fifty institutions of higher education.31  For 
this reason, the OCR adopted a policy interpretation meant to clarify the ways 
in which a school may stay in compliance with the regulation.32  Per the inter-
pretation, a plaintiff can bring a successful athletic-based Title IX claim against 
an educational institution by showing that an educational institution has failed 
to maintain compliance in financial assistance, other program areas, or in meet-
ing the interests and abilities of students of both genders.33  The majority of Title 
IX publicity stems from the third part of the policy interpretation, which pro-
vides what has come to be known as the “three-prong test.”34  If an institution 
can show substantial proportionality of students, history and continuing practice 
of expanding opportunities, or accommodation of the interests of the un-
derrepresented sex, then it will be deemed Title IX compliant.35   
                                                          
30. See generally TITLE IX AT THIRTY, supra note 19. 
31. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, 
A POLICY INTERPRETATION: TITLE IX AND INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (Dec. 11, 1979), available 
at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9interp.html [hereinafter 1979 POLICY 
INTERPRETATION].  
32. See id.  
33. See Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historical Review of Forty Legal 
Developments That Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 325, 336–40 (2012) [here-
inafter Title IX at Forty]. 
34. Id. at 339–40.  See also 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 31, at § VII(C)(5)(a).  Specifi-
cally, the three-prong test states, 
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students 
are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or 
 
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among intercolle-
giate athletes, whether the institution can show a history and continuing practice of program 
expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the 
members of that sex; or 
 
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, and 
the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited 
above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that 
sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program. 
 
Id. 
35. See 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 31.  
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Generally, the biggest issue for colleges and universities attempting to re-
main compliant with the three-prong test is maintaining proportionality.36  Un-
der this prong, the percentage of male and female student-athletes should be 
proportionate to the percentage of males and females attending the college or 
university.37  This issue has become prominent due to the fact that it frequently 
leads to schools cutting men’s athletic teams in order to reach substantial pro-
portionality.38  If the institution cannot prove that it has met one of the three 
prongs, “[a]lthough the statute itself provides for no remedies beyond the ter-
mination of federal funding, the Supreme Court has determined that Title IX is 
enforceable through an implied private right of action, and that damages are 
available for an action brought under Title IX.”39  While issues arising from a 
lack of equity among student-athletes seem to dominate the public’s discourse 
regarding Title IX, such issues are far from the full scope of claims brought 
under the statute.   
B. Title IX As a Tool for Eliminating Sex-Based Discrimination More 
Generally 
Since the implementation of Title IX and subsequent regulations, educa-
tional institutions receiving government financial aid have been tasked with en-
suring a prohibition of sex-based discrimination in their buildings and on their 
campuses.40  Beyond mandating equal opportunity in athletics, courts have also 
found that Title IX extends to the prohibition of sex-based employment discrim-
ination41 and sexual harassment.42   
When it comes to employment discrimination, one study found that over 
Title IX’s first thirty-five years as law, 19% of the litigation studied focused on 
employment discrimination claims.43  In North Haven Board of Education v. 
Bell, the Supreme Court held that the legislative history and statutory language 
of Title IX supported the conclusion that the law prohibits employment discrim-
ination.44  Further, the Court found that it was within the Department of Health, 
                                                          
36. See generally Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX’s Sex-Based 
Proportionality Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions Defensible?, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 731 
(2003). 
37. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 177 (1st Cir. 1996). 
38. See generally id.  
39. Id. at 167. 
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
41. See generally N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982). 
42. See generally Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
43. Paul Anderson & Barbara Osborne, Report: A Historical Review of Title IX Litigation, 18 J. 
LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 127, 136 (2008). 
44. N. Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. at 530.  
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Education, and Welfare’s (HEW) authority to implement regulations, such as 
revoking a school’s federal funding, to combat unfair employment policies.45  
Ultimately, the North Haven case made it apparent that an individual bringing 
a discrimination claim against an educational program could utilize Title IX.46   
The use of Title IX to eliminate sexual harassment in schools has also be-
come commonplace.  In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, a high 
school student brought a claim against her teacher and coach for his repeated 
sexual harassment.47  In this instance, the school had been notified of the issue 
and failed to take any action to end it, going so far as to discourage the student 
from pressing charges.48  Eventually, Franklin brought a claim that sought dam-
ages from the school for permitting the harassment to continue.49  The case made 
its way through the courts, and ultimately, the Supreme Court ruled that “Con-
gress had not limited the remedies available under Title IX,” permitting dam-
ages to be sought in the enforcement of the law going forward.50  This decision 
provided potential claimants a new form of relief, as well incentive to take ac-
tion against sexual harassment occurring in schools.51 
By the mid-1990s, it became commonplace for courts to review claims of 
sexual harassment committed by teachers, coaches, and fellow students.52  In 
1997, the OCR published its first guidance to help clarify the application of Title 
IX to sexual harassment, which stated that schools are required to have policies 
and procedures that afford fast and fair resolutions to sexual harassment claims 
by students.53  Further, it became clear that schools would be held accountable 
“for instances of quid pro quo sexual harassment[,] and may also be liable for 
hostile environment sexual harassment if the coach or other employee uses their 
apparent authority when they engage in harassing conduct.”54  Additionally, 
schools can be held liable for sexual harassment between students (i.e., 
peer-to-peer) if they permit a hostile environment to continue because they 
knew or should have known the harassment was occurring and failed to take 
quick and proper measures to eliminate the issue.55  As a result of the OCR’s 
                                                          
45. Id. at 537–39. 
46. Title IX at Forty, supra note 33, at 342.  
47. 503 U.S. 60, 63 (1992). 
48. Id. at 63–64.  
49. See Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 911 F.2d 617 (11th Cir. 1990). 
50. Title IX at Forty, supra note 33, at 346. 
51. See id.  
52. Id. at 356. 
53. Id.  
54. Id. 
55. Id.  
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guidance and subsequent cases,56 notice has been given to schools regarding 
their potential liability for harassing conduct by their staff or students.57  Be-
cause of this, schools must be sure to implement adequate procedures to avoid 
liability.   
C. Asserting a Title IX Claim 
Prior to 2009, a question existed as to a complainant’s ability to simultane-
ously bring Title IX and constitutional claims.58  Fitzgerald v. Barnstable 
School Committee brought this issue before the Supreme Court, when parents 
of a harassed grade school student cited Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause 
in their claim against the school.59  Initially, the Supreme Court analyzed prior 
decisions involving the assertion of claims under the Constitution and federal 
statutes, finding that “in determining whether a subsequent statute precludes the 
enforcement of a federal right under § 1983, [they] have placed primary empha-
sis on the nature and extent of that statute’s remedial scheme.”60  The Court 
determined that it had precluded the use of both the Constitution and federal 
statute in instances where the statute mandated that claimants exhaust certain 
administrative remedies or follow a particular procedure.61   
In the case of Title IX, the only enforcement mechanism written into the 
statute is the potential for withdrawal of federal funding.62  The Court found that 
this, coupled with the previously held implied right of action,63 amount to a 
much lesser enforcement scheme than those typically found.64  Further, the 
Court concluded that the actual rights provided for by the Equal Protection 
Clause and Title IX are quite different, vesting “divergent coverage.”65  As such, 
the Court determined that “Title IX was not meant to be an exclusive mechanism 
for addressing gender discrimination in schools, or a substitute for § 1983 suits 
as a means of enforcing constitutional rights” and “suits based on the Equal 
Protection Clause remain available to plaintiffs alleging unconstitutional gender 
                                                          
56. See Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Gebster v. Lago Vista Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
57. Title IX at Forty, supra note 33, at 361. 
58. See id. at 382. 
59. 555 U.S. 246, 246 (2009). 
60. Id. at 253. 
61. Id. at 254. 
62. Id. at 255.  
63. See generally Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
64. Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 255. 
65. Id. at 257–58. 
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discrimination in schools.”66 
Traditionally, Title IX gender discrimination claims are asserted by the per-
son or persons who feel a direct adverse effect as a result of a school’s non-com-
pliance.67  When issues do arise with Title IX compliance, it is commonplace to 
see individual employees, students, or student-athletes or members of an af-
fected team bring suit against the responsible institution.68  Less common, and 
decidedly more problematic, is when a third party, someone not directly affected 
by the potential breach in Title IX compliance, wishes to bring a claim against 
an institution.69  This becomes troublesome due to a plaintiff’s need to establish 
standing before he or she can bring a claim in court.  
III. THIRD-PARTY STANDING AND THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT IN RELATION 
TO ORGANIZATION-BASED TITLE IX CLAIMS 
In order for a party to have a lawsuit heard in court, the individual or group 
must have standing.70  An individual or group may establish third party standing 
by showing they have an interest in the issue that is the subject of the claim 
being brought.71  It is well established that an association or organization may 
bring a third party claim.72  What is less apparent is the requisite interrelation 
between an organization and the government action it seeks to prohibit.  Cur-
rently, a circuit split that exists over the issue is perpetuating this lack of clar-
ity.73  
A. Establishing Standing 
Before a plaintiff may bring a claim before a court, it must be determined 
that the party has proper standing—essentially, the right to be heard.74  Article 
III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution stipulates that the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts is limited to the types of cases and controversies listed within the 
                                                          
66. Id. at 258. 
67. See Title IX at Forty, supra note 33, at 342–347. 
68. See id. 
69. See Colton Puckett, American Sports Council v. United States Department of Education: Forty 
Years of Title IX and Still Standing (or Not), 20 SPORTS LAW. J. 261 (2013). 
70. Hassan v. Iowa, No. 4–11–CV–00574, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188213, at *3–4 (S.D. Iowa 
2012). 
71. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
72. See, e.g., Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011); City of Duluth 
v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 30 (D.D.C. 2013); Am. Sports Council v. Dep't of Educ., 
850 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.D.C. 2012). 
73. See Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d 91; cf. Am. Sports Council, 850 F. Supp. 2d 288. 
74. Hassan, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188213, at *3–4. 
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document.75  The Supreme Court provided an overview to Article III standing 
in a recent case when it said an injury must be “concrete, particularized, and 
actual or imminent[;] fairly traceable to the challenged action[;] and redressable 
by a favorable ruling.”76  Further, it has been emphasized that the party or parties 
bringing the claim bear the burden of establishing the Article III standing ele-
ments.77  Moreover, parties petitioning for federal jurisdiction must, “support 
each of the standing requirements with the same kind and degree of evidence at 
the successive stages of litigation as any other matter on which the plaintiff 
bears the burden of proof.”78  Typically, standing is reserved for the parties di-
rectly involved in the dispute; however, it is also possible for a third party to 
bring a claim.79 
B. Standing in a Title IX Claim 
As in any claim, when bringing a Title IX claim, the plaintiff—usually a 
student, student-athlete, or team—is charged with the task of proving standing 
based on a showing of injury, causation, and redressability (Essential Elements 
Test).80  In order to satisfy the first requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that an injury is “actual or imminent.”81  What is more, “[a] plaintiff seeking 
injunctive or declaratory relief cannot rely on past injury to satisfy the injury 
requirement but must show a likelihood that he or she will be injured in the 
future."82  If no further injury might occur, due to graduation or similar reason-
ing, a court may find a claim to be moot.83  In the case that parents are suing on 
behalf of their minor children, the court will determine standing based on the 
position of the underage individual, not his or her guardian.84  However, if par-
ents or guardians bring a claim themselves, rather than on behalf of their injured 
children, courts are inclined to find them wanting for an injury-in-fact.85  Once 
standing has been established, the plaintiff or plaintiffs may prevail by showing 
that the academic institution has caused an injury based on its non-compliance 
                                                          
75. See Puckett, supra note 69, at 265. 
76. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 140 (2010).  
77. Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 137 
(2014). 
78. Constitution Party of S.D. v. Nelson, 639 F.3d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 2011). 
79. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
80. McCormick v. Sch. Dist. of Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 284 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 285. 
84. Id. at 284. 
85. See generally Cobb v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Office for Civ. Rights, No. 05-2439, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 39985 (D. Minn. June 14, 2006). 
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with the regulations set forth in Title IX.86   
C. Establishing Third-Party Standing 
Third-party legal standing is not a new concept when it comes to who can 
and cannot bring a lawsuit.87  For a third party to be a permissible joinder to a 
claim, the individual or group must meet the guidelines detailed in Rule 24 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.88  Per the adequacy-based approach that 
directs Article III standing within the courts, claimants who can exhibit all parts 
of the Essential Elements Test are entitled to invoke the rights of a third party.89  
However, current doctrine maintains, as a prudential rule, that claimants gener-
ally lack standing to raise the rights of others.90  This presumption against the 
permissibility of third-party claims stems from relative standing, “since the per-
son with the greatest stake in asserting a particular right is normally the right 
holder herself.”91  To help overcome this presumption, a would-be third party 
claimant “must have a close relation to the third party, and there must exist some 
hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect his or her own interest.”92  
If the third party or parties can meet this burden, they may be permitted to 
have their case heard in court.  However, on numerous occasions, the Supreme 
Court has made it obvious that “a plaintiff’s standing fails where it is purely 
speculative that a requested change . . . will alter the behavior of regulated third 
parties that are the direct cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.”93  Further burdening 
the standing analysis are the methods for determining associational and organi-
zational standing—the standards for claims that are brought by entities made up 
                                                          
86. Id.  
87. See generally Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2010). 
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 24. On a timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who, 
 
(1) is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or 
 
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, 
and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede 




89. Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1223 (2014). 
90. Id. 
91. Id.  
92. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S 400, 411 (1991). 
93. Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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of many members.94 
D. Associational v. Organizational Third-Party Standing 
The terms “associational standing” and “organizational standing” suggest 
similar standards and are commonly analyzed together.95  However, it is im-
portant to note the differences between the two types of standing for this exam-
ination.   
1. Association Test 
Associational standing may be established when a group—meaning the 
overarching entity rather than the members within it—can show that (1) its in-
dividual members would have standing on their own; (2) the interests the group 
seeks to protect are relevant to its purpose; and (3) the lawsuit does not require 
that the individual members bring it (Association Test).96  This standard is per-
missive and broad in comparison to that of organizational standing, which in-
volves standing for the organization itself, rather than the members or owners 
within.97  
The case National Wrestling Coaches Association v. Department of Educa-
tion (NWCA) offers some insight into the requirements for bringing a third-party 
Title IX claim as an association.98  In this highly referenced case, the plaintiffs 
were the National Wrestling Coaches Association, the Marquette Wrestling 
Club, the Committee to Save Bucknell Wrestling, the College Sports Council, 
and the Yale Wrestling Association—all membership groups representing the 
interests of their respective schools’ wrestling coaches, athletes, and alumni.99  
The claimants centered their case on the assertion that the Three-Part Test im-
plemented by the 1979 Policy Interpretation violates the equal protection com-
ponent of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and requires academic in-
stitutions to intentionally discriminate in a way that goes directly against the 
policy of Title IX.100  
In order to be able to bring the claim, the plaintiffs were required to establish 
standing by fulfilling the three elements of the Association Test.101  Here, the 
                                                          
94. See Garrett, supra note 77, at 136–40. 
95. See Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011); cf. Am. Sports 
Council v. Dep’t of Educ., 850 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.D.C. 2012). 
96. Am. Sports Council, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 297–98. 
97. See Garrett, supra note 77, at 139. 
98. See 366 F.3d 930 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
99. Id. at 935. 
100. Id. at 936. 
101. Id. at 937. 
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plaintiffs alleged that their injuries were the result of the decisions of several 
federally-funded institutions that opted to eliminate their wrestling programs in 
order to maintain Title IX compliance.102  Ultimately, the court held that, despite 
showing that an injury-in-fact had occurred, the plaintiffs lacked standing due 
to their inability to show that a favorable decision would redress the injury.103  
The NWCA court made sure to elaborate on its decision to deny standing, 
pointing out that associational standing fails when it is based solely on specula-
tion that a requested change would alter the behavior of a third party that is 
directly causing the injury.104  Specifically, the court noted, 
 
[w]hen a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the Govern-
ment's regulation of a third party that is not before the court, it 
becomes “substantially more difficult” to establish stand-
ing . . . .  Because the necessary elements of causation and re-
dressability in such a case hinge on the independent choices of 
the regulated third party, “it becomes the burden of the plaintiff 
to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be 
made in such manner as to produce causation and permit re-
dressability of injury.”105 
 
The Association Test for establishing standing is well-documented and contin-
uously upheld.  The statement of the elements in NWCA has been cited and sus-
tained more than a dozen times in the ten years since the decision was handed 
down.106  Less consistently decided is the issue of organizational standing.  
2. Organization Test 
While an association may be granted standing “‘solely as the representative 
of its members’ where, inter alia, its members would have standing to sue in 
their own right,”107 organizational standing requires the entity to show it “suf-
fered a ‘concrete injury’ to its own interests, apart from any separately identified 
                                                          
102. See id. 
103. See id. at 938. 
104. See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2004).. 
105. Id. at 938 (citation omitted). 
106. See generally City of Duluth v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 30 (D.D.C. 2013); 
Bloomberg L.P. v. CFTC, 949 F. Supp. 2d 91 (D.D.C. 2013); Neighbors of Casino San Pablo v. Salazar, 
442 Fed. Appx. 579 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 428 F. Supp. 2d 585 
(W.D. Tex. 2006). 
107. Am. Sports Council v. Dep't of Educ., 850 F. Supp. 2d 288, 297 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Hunt v. 
Wash. St. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342 (1977)). 
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injury to third parties, such as employees, officers, owners, or shareholders.”108  
Further, an organization-plaintiff “must allege that its ‘activities have been im-
peded[,] not just that its mission has been compromised.’”109  Essentially, an 
organization can only establish standing “based on cognizable injury to it-
self.”110  To summarize these organizational standing principles into one test, it 
can be said that an entity must show that it experienced a tangible injury to its 
interests as a corporation, which obstructed its ability to carryout its undertak-
ings (Organization Test).   
Factually, it is difficult to imagine a Title IX-based situation that would re-
sult in the type of concrete harm to an entity that is necessary to successfully 
assert the Organization Test.  While not the result of a sex discrimination claim, 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife provides important language from the Supreme 
Court about the requisite proximity of the injury to the organization.111  In Lujan, 
the Defenders of Wildlife organization attempted to bring an action challenging 
a federal administrative regulation, citing the potential injury to wildlife as a 
nexus by which they had standing.112  The Court concluded the nexus theory 
was “beyond all reason,” going on to say, “Standing is not ‘an ingenuous aca-
demic exercise in the conceivable,’ but as we have said requires . . . a factual 
showing of perceptible harm.”113  In order to establish standing under this stand-
ard, an organization claiming a Title IX violation needs to show that said viola-
tion created a concrete injury to the entity, rather than simply establishing a 
close nexus between the harm and the interests the organization seeks to protect.  
Nationally, while issues of associational and organizational standing have 
seemingly been evenly implemented for years, as of 2012, a circuit split exists 
and confusion abounds regarding these types of standing in Title IX cases; this 
is due to the cases Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Department of Education114 and 
American Sports Council v. United States Department of Education.115 
                                                          
108. Garrett, supra note 77, at 139 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972)).  
109. Am. Sports Council, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 299 (citing Abigail Alliance for Better Access v. Esch-
enbach, 469 F.3d 129, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
110. Id. at 299. 
111. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1992). 
112. See id. 
113. Id. at 566 (citing U. S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 
U.S. 669, 688 (1973)). 
114. 639 F.3d 91 (4th Cir. 2011). 
115. 850 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.D.C. 2012). 
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E. Associational Standing and the Current Circuit Split 
1. Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Department of Education 
Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Department of Education, originating in the 
Fourth Circuit, is the result of a non-profit group suing the DOE and James 
Madison University for violations of Title IX.116  These actions stemmed from 
James Madison making the decision to cut seven men’s and three women’s ath-
letic teams in order to stay in compliance with the proportionality prong of the 
Three-Part Test.117  After learning of James Madison’s intent to disband the 
teams, opponents of the decision incorporated Equity in Athletics, Inc. (EIA) in 
order to challenge the proposed cuts. 118  EIA promptly filed a motion with the 
court for a preliminary injunction in order to prevent James Madison from cut-
ting the teams.119  The defendants, James Madison and the DOE, rebutted this 
action by swiftly filing a motion to dismiss, which was granted by the trial 
court.120  The district court reviewed the motion to dismiss de novo.121  
Both the DOE and James Madison disputed EIA’s standing to bring the 
case, but for varying reasons.122  The DOE contended that the underlying injury 
the corporation complained of could only be redressed by the university, and 
not through any action on the DOE’s own part.123  James Madison took issue 
with the fact that the incorporation did not include any female athletes on exist-
ing teams at the university, thus nullifying EIA’s right to dispute scholarship 
allocation.124  The court in Equity in Athletics seemingly made quick work of 
establishing EIA’s standing to bring a claim, finding that the entity had organi-
zational standing.125  Unfortunately, the aftermath of the decision is not quite so 
cut and dry due to the fact that the court actually used the Association Test under 
the organizational standing moniker in order to establish standing.126  
According to the court in Equity in Athletics, for the EIA to secure organi-
zational standing, the entity must satisfy the three prongs of the Associational 
                                                          
116. See Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d 91.  
117. Id. at 97. 
118. Id. at 98. 
119. Id. 
120. Id.  
121. Id. 
122. Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 98 (4th Cir. 2011). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 99.  
126. Id. 
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Test.127  Further, in order for the individual members of the organization to ful-
fill the first of the three Associational Test requirements, and therefore establish 
individual standing, the court found that they had to prove the elements of Ar-
ticle III standing, namely that “(1) they suffered an actual or threatened injury 
that is concrete, particularized, and not conjectural; (2) the injury is fairly trace-
able to the challenged conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a 
favorable decision.”128 
In this instance, despite the organizational terminology used, the court ac-
tually held that EIA had associational standing to bring claims against the DOE 
and James Madison.129  First, the court stated that the individual members had 
standing to sue on their own, EIA sought to protect interests directly related to 
its purpose, and the suit did not require the participation of individual members, 
thus establishing associational standing.130  Second, the court found that EIA’s 
members had adequately shown the elements of injury, causation, and redress-
ability as a result of James Madison and the DOE’s actions, resulting in Article 
III standing.131  This outcome creates questions as to precedent regarding organ-
izational and associational standing due to the incorrect standard the court used 
to establish EIA’s organizational standing.  Further, because the case stems from 
a factual situation that many courts face, it does not match up with the resulting 
holdings in other circuits nationally.   
2. American Sports Council v. United States Department of Education   
In American Sports Council v. United States Department of Education, de-
cided in the District Court for the District of Columbia, the plaintiff—American 
Sports Council (ASC)—is described as a “‘coalition of coaches, athletes, for-
mer-athletes, parents, and fans’ organized as a nonprofit.”132  ASC filed its claim 
against the DOE seeking, among other things, injunctive relief in order to pre-
vent the DOE’s use of the Three-Part Test at the high school level.133  ASC 
purported that the implementation of the test at that level would result in lost 
athletic and coaching opportunities for student-athletes and coaches.134  This 
                                                          
127. Id. (stating “(1) that its members would have standing to sue as individuals; (2) that the interests 
it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (3) that the suit does not require the 
participation of individual members.”) (citation omitted). 
128. Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 99 (4th Cir. 2011).  
129. Id. at 100. 
130. Id. at 99. 
131. Id. at 99–100. 
132. 850 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (D.D.C. 2012). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 298. 
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claim was not ASC’s first against the DOE; the non-profit previously brought 
claims that were all dismissed for varying reasons.135  The defendant quickly 
moved to have the case dismissed, claiming that ASC lacked subject matter ju-
risdiction to bring the claim as a result of a lack of standing.136  
Arguing against the DOE’s contention that ASC did not have proper stand-
ing, the non-profit leaned on both the organizational and associational standing 
theories.137  In reference to organizational standing, ASC claimed that the “de-
fendants’ actions caused injury to the organization itself, and that [the] injury is 
redressable by a favorable decision from [the] Court.”138  Unlike in Equity in 
Athletics, this court correctly stated the Organizational Test.  Elaborating on the 
organizational standing claim, ASC purported that the DOE’s refusal to retract 
the applicability of the Three-Part Test in high schools athletics “frustrates its 
organizational mission . . . of ‘preserving and promoting opportunities for stu-
dents to participate in organized athletics at the collegiate and high school lev-
els.’”139  The court recognized that it is possible for an organization to have 
standing based on cognizable injury to the entity; however, it found that this 
claim lacked merit due to the absence of causation and redressability.140   
Turning its attention to associational standing, the ASC claimed it had 
standing to bring the lawsuit “as the representative of ‘coaches, athletes, for-
mer-athletes, parents, and fans’ affected by the application of the Three-Part 
Test.”141  Looking to the elements of the Association Test, the court found that 
ASC had failed to establish that any one of the entities it claimed to represent 
would have had standing to bring the claim on its own.142  Additionally, the 
court pointed out that it had declined to find associational standing in the Title 
                                                          
135. Id. at 291. 
136. Id. at 292. 
137. Id. at 297–300. 
138. Am. Sports Council v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 850 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (D.D.C. 2012). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. Elaborating on the issue, the court reasoned, 
 
To claim organizational standing, plaintiff must allege that its “activities have been im-
peded[,]” not just that its “mission has been compromised.”  Thus, the allegation that de-
fendants' actions impede plaintiff's other activities by necessitating diversion of resources 
to combat the campaigns of "activist groups" to "apply the Three-Part Test to high school 
Athletics" becomes central to plaintiff's claim.  There can be no organizational standing 
where plaintiff cannot "show 'actual or threatened injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the 
alleged illegal action and likely to be redressed by a favorable court decision.'” 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
141. Id. at 297. 
142. Id. at 298–99. 
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IX context previously, pointing to its decision in NWCA.143   
Ultimately, the court found that ASC lacked numerous requisite traits to 
bring a claim in the federal court.144  Summarizing its finding, the court stated 
in its conclusion that ASC was not to be granted standing simply by virtue of 
the fact that it suffered procedural injury as a result of the DOE’s denial of its 
original petition.145  The court ensured its opinion would be clear to all when it 
further opined,  
 
[t]he claim that activist groups filed complaints “[p]ursuant to 
the Department's failure to clarify that the Three-Part Test does 
not apply to high school athletics” . . . is no more than “mere 
‘unadorned speculation’ as to the existence of a relationship be-
tween the challenged government action and the third-party 
conduct [and] ‘will not suffice to invoke the federal judicial 
power.’”146 
 
Based on this strong wording by the members of the District of Columbia’s 
judiciary, there is a divide on the issue of associational standing (termed organ-
izational standing in Equity in Athletics) between it and the judiciary in the 
Fourth Circuit.  Specifically, the circuits are at odds in regards to the threshold 
for showing that a defendant’s actions caused harm or threatened harm to the 
members of an organization (i.e. that the harm was traceable).147  
IV. PREDICTING THE APPLICATION OF THIRD-PARTY STANDING TO PUBLIC 
INTEREST GROUPS 
The contrary holdings in American Sports Council and Equity in Athletics 
raise questions as to how courts should address issues of associational standing 
with regard to third-party Title IX claims. The proper threshold for proving in-
jury as a result of the challenged conduct in unknown due to the circuit split.148  
It is quite possible that the circuits will remain split until such point that the 
United States Supreme Court accepts a case dealing with the issue; however, 
the Supreme Court accepting such a case is not a guarantee.  At first blush, the 
outcome of American Sports Council seems to overlook the important detail that 
                                                          
143. Id.  
144. Am. Sports Council v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 850 F. Supp. 2d 288, 300 (D.D.C. 2012). 
145. Id.  
146. Id. 
147. See Am. Sports Council, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 298; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d 91. 
148. See Am. Sports Council, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 298; see also Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d 91. 
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“‘standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention,’” in-
stead falling into the trap that appears when a claim seems to hold no merit.149   
As a result of the holdings in American Sports Council, parties aggrieved 
by Title IX or other regulations would be forced to take up the issue with the 
courts individually, rather than filing the claim jointly as a non-profit group or 
other similarly situated entity.  This would potentially eliminate courts being 
flooded by fledgling public interest groups looking for any and all opportunities 
to have their opinions heard.  With our nation’s vastly overcrowded judicial 
system, the idea of eliminating somewhat frivolous claims is, admittedly, ap-
pealing.  However, continuing with such a system seems contrary to citizens’ 
right to standing as afforded by the United States Constitution and other perti-
nent regulations.  For this reason, the analysis provided in Equity in Athletics 
seems a better tool with which to predict future standing issues, as it is more in 
keeping with the litany of holdings that came before it.  
Under the scope of Equity in Athletics, it seems unlikely that a public inter-
est group such as Gender Justice could bring a successful claim against the Uni-
versity of Iowa or other schools similarly situated based upon associational 
standing.  As noted in the previous cases, in order to bring a claim on behalf of 
its members, Gender Justice would have to show that the individual members 
(1) suffered actual or threatened harm; (2) that the harm was traceable to the 
challenged conduct; and (3) that the harm is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
ruling.150  It appears probable that Gender Justice would face a substantial chal-
lenge in trying to prove all three elements. 
Seemingly, Gender Justice’s members do not include football players, 
coaches, or assistants who have come in contact with the pink locker room at 
the University of Iowa or elsewhere.  In the cases previously discussed, each 
plaintiff was either a non-profit group composed of injured parties or a non-
profit group representing parties that had been injured by a Title IX issue.151  
Here, the members seem to postulate that the pink-hued walls somehow ad-
versely affect the desire of females at the University of Iowa to participate in 
athletics, thus creating an ability for the University to field larger male 
squads.152  Even if that were the case, it would be an uphill battle for the group 
to find potential female athletes, coaches, and the like who feel this way, which 
is necessary to establish associational standing.153  Should Gender Justice locate 
                                                          
149. Puckett, supra note 69, at 275. 
150. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d at 99. 
151. See id.; see, e.g., Am. Sports Council, 850 F. Supp. 2d 288; Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. 
Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930 (U.S. App. D.C. 2004). 
152. See Buzuvis, supra note 13, at 47. 
153. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d at 99. 
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a group of females at the University of Iowa who are willing to say that their 
desire to participate has been adversely affected by the visiting football locker 
rooms, the group would still have to show that the injury was specifically trace-
able to the color of the walls in a room the females have never entered.  Further, 
the group would need to show that, by repainting the locker room walls a more 
conventional color, the assembled group of females would then be more moti-
vated to participate in athletics at the school.  
Based on these analyses, the most effective way for Gender Justice—and 
all others concerned with the implications raised by allowing the continuance of 
pink locker rooms—to impart change may simply be to continue raising aware-
ness regarding what they deem to be a disturbing issue.  Until the time that they 
can form an organization dedicated to the cause and that includes members di-
rectly injured by the issue, a day in court seems to be a non-option for the group.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The controversy surrounding the concept of pink shaming in men’s locker 
rooms has maintained traction in the media since Professor Buzuvis initially 
raised the issue in 2005.154  With the continued persistence of Gender Justice, it 
is not a topic that promises to disappear any time soon.  However, threatening 
schools with potential legal claims may not be as straight forward as the public 
interest group makes it seem.  This Comment does not attempt to analyze the 
existence—or lack thereof—of Title IX liability for schools such as the Univer-
sity of Iowa that choose to maintain examples of pink shaming in their athletic 
facilities.  However, before the courts can examine the potential existence of a 
Title IX issue, a plaintiff must first establish the requisite standing.155  The abil-
ity for Gender Justice to establish standing to bring a Title IX claim is question-
able.  
Despite the confusing message set forth by the circuit split within the courts, 
it seems clear that, in order to bring a claim based on associational standing, a 
party must be able to show that its members have been directly harmed by the 
actions of another party, that the harm is traceable to the conduct that is being 
challenged, and that the harm will be remedied by a sympathetic court ruling.156  
Based on these requirements, it does not seem as though a non-profit group such 
as Gender Justice has the means of bringing suit against the University of Iowa 
or other academic institutions that choose paint their locker rooms a controver-
sial color.157  Until such time as an individual player or coach that has been 
                                                          
154. See Bierman, supra note 1; Haney, supra note 1; Richmond, supra note 5.    
155. Hassan v. Iowa, No. 4–11–CV–00574, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188213, *3–4 (S.D. Iowa 2012). 
156. Equity in Athletics, Inc., 639 F.3d at 99. 
157. See discussion supra Part IV. 
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directly affected by the color scheme at Kinnick Stadium comes forward with a 
claim, the University of Iowa may maintain the rosy disposition imparted upon 
the locker room by Coach Fry.  
 
 
